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Small Business Growth and Survival
During the First Two Years
Kurt B. Mayer and Sidney Goldstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans have always valued individual enterprise. The great
esteem in which economic independence is held today is firmly
grounded in our historical experience. Early American history was a
history of small entrepreneurs who established a society which differed
sharply in its social characteristics from that of European nations.
Unlike Europe, America never knew either the hereditary aristocracy
or the servile peasantry of feudalism. Due to this absence of feudal
restriction and privilege, most of the virgin territory was occupied
by free farmers who owned the land they cultivated. From the be-
ginning, the American farmer, in addition to being a husbandman
and cultivator, has always been an enterpriser, capitalist and specu-
lator.
The small agrarian producer had his counterpart in the early town
merchant, a versatile businessman who often engaged simultaneously
in trading, shipping, moneylending, speculating and even small-scale
manufacturing. In addition, there were many craftsmen of inde-
pendent means. Of course, in early America, there were people who
owned no property, as well as ,those who were themselves the property
of others.
The outstanding characteristic of this society was that the great
majority of the population were owners of their own means of live-
lihood. It was truly a society of independent enterprisers. Rank and
position rested upon the quantity and quality of property owned;
income was derived from working on one's own property. Therefore,
the American image as a society of individual enterprisers is firmly
grounded in the social reality of these formative years. The high value
which present-day society assigns to individual enterprise and inde-
pendent opportunity reflects this image.
The impact of the industrial revolution drastically reduced the
prominence of the small agrarian producer. The proportion of those
gainfully employed in agriculture dropped from 72 per cent in 1820,
to 51 per cent in 1870.' By 1910, only one-third of the gainfully
* Professors of Sociology, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island.
1. CLARK, THE CoNirrIoNs OF ECONOMIC PnOcREss, 519-20 (table 3) (3d ed. 1957).
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employed Americans remained in agriculture, and, by 1963, agri-
cultural employment had dwindled to 7 per cent of the total labor
force. Moreover, only 60 per cent of those employed in agriculture
today are independent farmers.
Although the fundamental transition of American society from an
agricultural to an urban-industrial base has continued to reduce the
TABLE 1.-FAB mBs AND BusmnEss ENTER~MSERS
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1880-19602
Self-Employed Farmers Business Enterprisers
Number As a percentage Number As a percentage
Year (in thousands) of all gainful (in thousands) of all gainful
workers* workers*
1880 4,243 27.8 1,218 8.0
1890 5,304 24.6 1,719 8.0
1900 5,705 21.4 2,198 8.2
1910 6,132 17.6 2,682 7.7
1920 6,387 16.0 2,573 6.5
1930 6,012 12.7 3,101 6.6
1940 5,212 9.6 4,378 8.0
1950 4,558 7.3 5,439 8.8
1960 2,560 3.6 5,342 7.6
*For the years 1880-1930, gainfully occupied persons 10 years old and over; for
1940-1960, persons in the civilian labor force 14 years old and over.
relative position of the agricultural producer, the non-farm enter-
priser has firmly stood his ground. As Table 1 indicates, the number
of business enterprisers has grown from 1.2 million in 1880, to over 5
million in 1950 and 1960. Despite some fluctuations, the proportion
of these enterprisers in the total gainfully employed population has
remained nearly constant, between 1880 and 1960, ranging from 6.5
to 8.8 between 6.5 per cent in 1880, to 8.8 per cent in 1960. To be
sure, the growth of non-farm enterprisers has not compensated for
the decline of agrarian enterprisers, but the persistence of the former
in the face of far-reaching economic and social changes is remarkable.
During the middle decades of the twentieth century, five million
businessmen carried on the tradition of economic independence. The
traditional opportunity of "working for oneself," of "being one's own
boss," of achieving a position of prestige and social standing is now
identified'with business ownership. Today, the small businessman is
2. The 1880-1950 data is from PHIsLIS, LrrrLE BUSINESS IN THEi AzEmiCAN ECON-
omY, 4 (table 2) (1958), while the 1960 data is from 1 U.S. BUREAU OF nTHE
CENSUS, 1960 CENSUS OF POPULATION (pt. 1) 1-215.
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a substitute for the Jeffersonian ideal of the small agrarian producer.
The historical statistics on the number of individual enterprisers
presented in Table 1 can be supplemented by further statistical data
which trace the development of business firms during the present
century. Changes in the number of firms closely correspond to
changes in the number of enterprisers. Fewer than 1.7 million
business firms were in existence in 1900 (see Table 2). Their number
increased steadily until it reached 4.8 million in 1963. Comparing this
increase in the number of business firms with general population
trends, a close similarity between the patterns of growth of the
human population and those of the business population is apparent.
In 1900, there were approximately 22 business firms for every 1,000
inhabitants of the United States, and 57 firms per 1,000 gainfully
employed persons. In 1963, there were 23 firms per 1,000 population
and 66 firms per 1,000 gainfully employed. The net change in the
number of business firms has kept pace with the general growth of
our human population and with the increase in gainful employment.
The data on the number of business firms in existence demonstrate
the remarkable resiliency of non-farm enterprises. Despite structural
changes in the economy that have altered the character of business
and despite the continuous trend toward economic concentration, the
rate of industrialization and urbanization has been so rapid that, rela-
tive to total population, more business firms are in operation today
than at the beginning of this century. However, the persistence and
durability does not imply stability in the individual business unit.
The growth figures conceal the turnover which annually characterizes
the business world. While the total number of concerns has been
continuously increasing, the composition of this aggregate number
has been changing rapidly. For example, statistics on the business
population reveal the following: From January 1, 1955, to December
31, 1962, the total number of firms in operation rose from 4,287,000
to 4,797,000, an increase of 510,000 units. During this eight year
period, however, no less than 3,354,000 newly established business
concerns opened their doors and 2,843,000 others went out of busi-
ness.4 Underlying the small net changes in aggregate numbers
is a persistent succession of business entries and failures and a hard
struggle for individual survival.
The high turnover rate of business enterprises is well known and
has been of considerable concern for several decades. During the
last thirty years, numerous studies of widely varying scope have
investigated the survival patterns, the life span, and the causes of
4. U.S. BunAu OF THE CENSUS, 1964 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
487; U.S. BuRFAu OF THE CENsus, 1959 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
485.
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mortality of various enterprises. 5 The most comprehensive data have
been assembled by the Office of Business Economics of the United
States Department of Commerce, which has collected and published
nation-wide statistics of business turnover since 1940. All investiga-
tions, official and private, emphasize the high incidence of "infant"
mortality.
Since a large majority of the nation's business films are small units,
it is not surprising that they constitute a large proportion of the annual
business turnover. In 1956, 75.3 per cent of the nation's 4.4 million
business firms were small units with fewer than four employees.6
Moreover, 65.3 per cent of all these were retail and service establish-
ments. During 1951-1955, 87 per cent of the 1.8 million new
businesses that opened had less than four employees. Of the addi-
tional 1.9 million enterprises that were transferred to new ownership
during this five year period, 83 per cent'had less than four employees.7
Unfortunately, data on business closings by size of firm are not
available for this same period. The most recent figures refer to the
period 1940-1945. These reveal 91 per cent of the approximately 2
million firms that closed had fewer than four employees."
The overwhelming preponderance of small units in the business
turnover more than nearly reflects the fact that the great majority of
all firms in operation at any one time are small businesses. It strongly
suggests that the small companies are less stable than the large ones.
As an illustration, in 1944-1945, when closures were unusually low
due to war conditions, the mortality rate among finns with less than
four employees was more than four times as great as among concerns
with more than fifty employees. The birth rate was more than ten
times higher for small firms than for larger concerns. 9 Some variation
of experience does occur in different communities, in different fields of
business, and under changing business conditions, but high mortality
is not primarily a cyclical phenomenon. On the contrary, it is all-
pervasive; the most striking fact is the regularity of failure and the
5. Almost 100 empirical studies undertaken during the 120's and 1930's are sum-
marized in PROBLEMS OF SmALL BusNss (TNEC Monograph No. 17, 1941). For a
more recent comprehensive analysis, see PfuLLnps, op. cit. supra note 2. Monthly data
on failures are published in Dun's Review published by Dun & Bradstreet; this publica-
tion also contains occasional analyses of business turnover.
6. Churchill, Size of Business Firms, Survey of Current Business, Office of Business
Economics, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Sept. 1959, vol. 39, pp. 15-16.
7. Id. at 18.
8. Ulmer, The Postwar Business Population, Survey of Current Business, Office of
Business Economics, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Jan. 1947, vol. 27, p. 13.
9. Paden & Nielsen, Recent Trends in the Business Population, Survey of Current
Business, Office of Business Economics, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, May 1946, vol. 26,
p. 20.
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persistence of high turnover rates.10
The results of these business studies have proved valuable in
pointing to some of the main problems of business growth and sur-
vival. Most of these studies, however, have been subject to one
major limitation: they have been based on the records of established
or defunct concerns, thereby restricting analysis to statistical data.
Since figures abstracted from statistical records serve merely as broad
indicators of the continuous turmoil that characterizes the business
population, they provide minimal insight into what actually occurs
in the succession of business openings, transfers and discontinuances.
They provide little concrete information about the precise circum-
stances attendant upon new business formations and the fate which
new concerns encounter.
Individual cases of small business have not yet been studied
systematically in sufficient number or detail to provide answers to
such crucial questions as:
What prompted the individuals to set up a new business enter-
prise?
What factors determined their timing, their choice of field, and
their choice of location?
What alternatives did they have from which to choose?
What are the capital resources of the new enterprise, the credit
arrangements?
What are the major decisions facing the going concern?
Is the business growing, holding its own, or declining?
What seem to be the factors determining its development?
If the enterprise is discontinued, what are the circumstances,
what are the reasons, and what happens to the owners?
Questions of this kind can be answered only through a longitudinal
field investigation that begins with a group of newly formed small
business establishments and follows them through repeated inter-
views for several years. This report is based on a study which
attempted such an investigation."
II. TnE RESEARCH DESIGN
The research design employed in this project involved the selection
of eighty-one newly established retail and service enterprises in three
10. Compare the Poughkeepsie study by Hutchinson, Hutchinson, & Newcomer, A
Study in Business Mortality, 28 AM. ECON. REV. 497-514 (1938), which analyzes turn-
over data extending back to the 1840s.
11. MAYER & GoLDSTmN, THE FIRST Two YEArS: PR OBLEMS OF SMALL FRM
GRowTH AND SURVIVAL (U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, SMALL BusNEss
RESEARCH SERIEs No. 2, 1961).
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sectors of metropolitan Providence, Rhode Island, the central city of
the metropolitan area, two rapidly growing contiguous suburban
cities, and three old industrial satellite cities, which had been
experiencing economic stagnation. The monthly lists of new businesses
registered with the Rhode Island Division of Taxation or with the
Department of Employment Security provided the roster from which
the business concerns included in this study were serially selected.
For the purposes of this study, a new business was defined as one
which either had been newly established or had recently changed
ownership.
In order to know who opens a business and why, as well as the
specific circumstances which accompany its inception, development,
survival or demise, information must be obtained through direct
contacts with the business owners over an extended period. Reasons
for success or failure cannot be identified completely through ques-
tioning a business owner. They may be identifiable only through
direct observation of his business behavior and of the physical en-
viromnent in which he operates. The need for these diverse types of
information requires a combination of interviewing and observation
techniques.
Following selection of the sample, the owner of each concern was
contacted, and his cooperation for the study was solicited. In the
initial interview, information was obtained revealing the owner's
social background, circumstances underlying the establishment of the
business, the type of business and its financial structure, and the
enterprisers own expectations. The interview was supplemented by
observing the physical features and the 'population composition of
the neighborhood, the appearance of the business proper, and the
personal characteristics of the owner.
12
Personal contact was maintained with each firm periodically for a
two-year period to ascertain the progress of the business. The two-
year period was selected. since all previous studies have indicated
that a high percentage of business discontinuances occur within a
year or two after establishment. In the beginning, the periodic
interviews were conducted at monthly intervals; thereafter the interval
12. At the time the initial interviews were completed, the data collected were used
as a basis for predicting the fate of each firm by the end of the study period. The
closure of 26 firms, 18 of which actually failed, was predicted. Of the remaining
8 which were expected to close but which in fact survived, 6 are in the "marginal
survivor" category. Of the 55 firms which were expected to survive, 33 actually did
so. Of the remaining 22, 8 were nonfinancial closures all of which could have survived
on purely financial grounds. However, the prediction was in error in the remaining 14
cases which failed. While the record of prediction was better than mere chance, it
is clear that the impressions gained from an early interview are not adequate for
predicting future developments with a high degree of confidence.
1755
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between interviews was allowed to vary from four to ten weeks,
depending upon the circumstances revealed by the previous contacts.
At the end of both the first and the second year of the business'
existence, the interviews were specifically designed to review the
developments of the preceding year. In addition to solicited responses,
changes in the business area, in the business establishment, and in the
behavior and attitude of the owner, were recorded.
For all firms which closed before the end of the two year period,
data were obtained to the point of discontinuance. In addition, a
special interview was designed to collect information regarding the
factors which led to the discontinuance. In order to evaluate more
fully the circumstances underlying discontinuances and success, inter-
views were also conducted with leading suppliers and creditors of
both the closed and the surviving firms.
III. CARAcREPuSTICS OF THE OWNERS AND Fumis
One of the findings of this study is the extent to which the goal of
business ownership has been adopted by the working class. It is one
of the few middle class occupations attainable by manual workers
whose educational limitations preclude an executive or professional
career. Of the 93 owners involved in the 81 firms, 64 had at some
time been employed in manual work. In fact, 40 per cent of the
total had only manual work experience prior to the opening of their
enterprise. One third of the 64 enterprisers with manual work
experience had also owned other businesses previously. Some of
these had started their occupational careers as manual workers but
had then consecutively operated a series of business enterprises; others
had moved back and forth between manual work and self-employ-
ment. In eight other cases, the occupational career pattern had been
even more complex, alternating between manual work, white collar
employment, and business ownership. Twenty-eight of the enter-
prisers in the sample had no manual work experience. Their careers
were restricted either to white collar employment, business owner-
ship, or movement back and forth between the two. The conclusion to
be derived from examining the prior occupational experience of the
owners is that an important aspect of social mobility in American
society consists of repeated crossings between the white collar, blue
collar, and self-employed levels of occupation, with relatively little
permanence at any level. This is further borne out by the fact that of
the 45 owners whose businesses closed 18 are known to have subse-
quently returned to manual employment and 7 are known to have
taken white collar positions.
The educational achievement of the owners was related to their
[ VOL. 18
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occupational experience, their age, and ethnic background. The
median educational attainment of the owners was 11 years of school-
ing which compared favorably with the 9.3 median acquired by the
population of Rhode Island 25 years old and over. Examination of
the individual case records indicates that few owners had formal edu-
cation or vocational training directly relevant to their business careers.
The road to business ownership tended to be lengthy. For some,
the desire to establish their own business was the result of a prior work
experience. For others, the fruition of an aspiration to be self-
employed had to await the accumulation of the necessary capital.
The average age of new owners was also raised by the fact that many
older persons, unable to find a job because of their age, sought income
through self-employment. The median age of the sample was forty
years. If not for the fact that this study began in a period of reces-
sion, 1958, when young persons as well as older ones were seeking
escape from unemployment, the age level would likely have been
higher.
Reflecting the increase of married women in the labor force, 17
of the 93 owners were women. Observers seldom consider women as
business owners, but tend to categorize them into factory, clerical or
sales jobs. However, business ownership appears as an attractive
alternative to employment for the working wife or the career woman.
Direct questions on reasons for going into business were generally
answered in cliches such as "to be independent" and/or "to make
money," rather than by basic motives. In many cases, it was apparent
that the owners did not consciously know why they went into busi-
ness; often they had no clear goals in mind, having little, if any,
appreciation of the business world in general. The most striking fact
revealed by the motivational analysis is the small number who sought
maximum money rewards. Only 6 of the 81 openings conformed to
the stereotype entrepreneur who attempts to isolate the most profitable
opportunities by a careful calculation of costs, sales volume, location,
competition, and, above all, the financial returns from self-employment
as compared with the potential income from paid employment.
In the large majority of other cases monetary values were also
present, but they had a different meaning. Thus, 21 openings were
prompted by a desperate need for providing some income because of
prospective or actual unemployment. Thirty-two owners were not
under immediate pressure of unemployment but viewed business
ownership simply as a means of livelihood. They were largely former
manual workers who were satisfied if their incomes as business owners
were comparable to the money earned as workers. They believed that
self-employment offered greater security, higher prestige, and more
1965 ] 1757
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independence. There were only eight cases in which the desire for
independence stood out as the major motive for entering business.
In the remaining fourteen cases, the motivation included the desire
to augment income from other sources, and the desire to build up
a business as an eventual substitute for salaried employment.
The motivational analysis partly explains the frequent interchange
between paid employment and self-employment. To the extent that
these owners viewed self-employment simply as another means of
making a living, it appeared to them as not fundamentally different
from a paid job. Some of them made the transition to business owner-
ship with no more effort or planning than they would in applying for
a job. Some businesses were opened in a reckless, gambling spirit,
"just to see what would happen."
This attitude applied also to the choice of a location, the timing
of the opening, and the financial resourcei available at the time of
opening. Very few owners gave consideration to locational factors.
For most, the particular location was determined by such factors as
a vacancy, a business for sale, or proximity to the owner's home. Only
8 owners made a traffic count, and only 14 obtained advice before
selecting a location. No more rational consideration was given to the
timing of the opening. Most persons in the sample opened at that
particular time because suddenly there was an opportunity, such as
a vacancy, and they took advantage of it.
The lack of planning, revealed by the minimal consideration given
timing, is particularly noteworthy in view of the fact that the period
during which all 81 businesses were opened was a period of pro-
nounced economic recession. It is unknown, of course, how many
potential enterprisers were deterred from going into business during
this time. With respect to the 81 who did open, the recession was
a contributory factor to those who resorted to business ownership
as an escape from unemployment. However, none of the owners
seriously considered the effects that the recession might have on their
chances for survival. Only two persons in the sample even mentioned
the recession as a factor influencing the timing of their opening, and
they thought it was "a good idea to start in bad times and work toward
better times." "If one can survive now, the rest will be O.K." To be
sure, many of the owners were quick to complain about the recession
when business did not progress as well as they had hoped, but it is
significant that few of them had had the foresight to anticipate the
adverse effects of the recession. Apparently, in most cases, the wish
was the father of the thought; once a person had decided to open a
business, he did not weigh with circumspection all of the factors
which might affect his chances for success. Instead, he saw only
[ VOL. 181758
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what he wished to see, the opportunity to realize his desire to be
in business for himself. This is also evident in the selection of a
location, a factor generally considered of primary importance.
Thirty-five of the 81 businesses involved a transfer to new owner-
ship. Even though they had few illusians of great financial success,
many of these 35 new owners apparently felt that they could succeed
where others had failed. Even where an investigation of the per-
formance of the previous owner was conducted, the results of the
survey did not discourage the prospective proprietor. They ration-
alized the situation by blaming the financial difficulties of the pre-
vious owner on some personal deficiency, thereby justifying their own
decision. The same kind of reasoning was frequently employed by
owners who did not buy a going concern but established a new firm
on a site previously occupied by an identical enterprise. This was
typical in the case of service stations where new men acquired a
station with knowledge that the previous occupant had been un-
successful. In such cases, they generally traced the failure to the
predecessor's lack of mechanical skill or inefficient business habits.
By any criteria, all 81 businesses were small. Twenty-five firms
initially had no employees; 26 others relied exclusively on uncompen-
sated assistants; and the remaining 30 firms employed a total of
forty full-time salaried personnel. The average initial capital invest-
ment amounted to 5,000 dollars, ranging from 12 dollars to 37,000
dollars, with one-third of the investments under 2,000 dollars. Sixty
per cent of the aggregate investment of 394,000 dollars was in the
form of equity capital.
The great majority of the owners had given little, if any, considera-
tion to the minimum investment required for the successful operation
of a new business. Generally, they had only vague notions about
the amounts of cash, stock, and credit required to maintain operations
until the business could support itself. Most of the owners com-
mitted all their liquid resources at the beginning of the venture.
Coupled with the difficulty of obtaining loans, this commitment left
them without reserves on which to draw when unexpected obstacles
or emergencies arose. Moreover, most of the owners apparently did
not separate their business and personal finances. Although direct
access to the financial records was not available in most cases, it was
clear from the answers given in the interviews that many owners
used the same bank account for both their personal expenditures and
their business operations. Similarly, grocery store owners would use
their stock for family consumption without appropriate notation in the
records. As a result, the owners in many cases were unable to
determine whether the business was operating at a profit or loss.
1965] 1759
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Furthermore, as later experience in several cases indicated, this initial
failure to distinguish clearly between business capital and personal
finances resulted in financial disaster for the individual and his family.
On the whole, the data suggest that the entire capitalization process
of newly established retail and service enterprises is largely based on
trial and error.
IV. GROWTH AND DECLINE
During the two year period the 81 firms followed different courses
of development. Although the experience of each firm was unique, it
was possible to classify them into eight categories. The basic distinc-
tion was between the-40 firms that dissolved and the 41 that survived.
Among those which closed, a further distinction was made between
32 firms that failed financially and 8 that closed for nonfinancial
reasons.
Among the 32 failures, the life span ranges from a minimum of three
weeks to twenty-one months. These 32 failures were grouped into
three categories: "stillbirths," 4 firms which closed within less than
two months; "infant deaths," 19 firms which lasted from two to ten
months; and 9 firms which struggled on, despite "the losing fight,"
from twelve to twenty-one months. The failure of these firms is
illustrated by the fact that the 25 firms for which financial data were
available lost 43 per cent of their total investment, considering cash
withdrawals by the owners during the life of the business as well as
salvage from sale or liquidation of the business.
Evaluation of the interview material of the 41 surviving firms
suggested four types. Twelve firms were classified as "marginal
survivors." These were mainly part-time operations, providing their
owners with less than a minimum living. Although covering a con-
siderable range financially, 21 firms qualified as "limited successes,"
yielding their owners sufficient income on which to live. These firms
had reached a stable level of operations and displayed doubtful
prospects of further growth. The remaining 8 survivors were more
successful, 3 of them yielding the owners profits above their salaries,
and the others showing a similar future promise. The aggregate
growth of the 41 survivors was evidenced by increases in staff, sales,
cash withdrawals, investment, and reduction in outstanding loans.
Even if all five firms classified as "potentially profitable" entered
the "profitable" category, successful business would represent only
10 per cent of the total sample. Since no comparable statistics
are available, this proportion cannot be classified as typical of new
businesses in the retail and service fields. In view of the high rates
of infant mortality which are known to prevail among such enter-
1760 [ VOL, IS
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prises, the fact that only one of ten firms was a successful venture
does not seem unusually low. Yet, if this proportion is typical, its
implications for a potential entrepreneur undertaking a business
venture are sobering indeed. For example, during the years 1951-1955,
an annual average of 445,000 retail or service firms with less than
four employees were started or transferred. 15 If the probability of
success, based on the findings of this study, is applied to this na-
tional total, a maximum of 45,000 of these enterprises can be expected
to be profitable ventures.
It should not be assumed that all owners of newly established firms
expect "to make a killing." As the analysis shows, only a small fraction
of the owners in this study entertained such aspirations. The great
majority expected only to earn a livelihood. Of the 81 firms, only 6
were opened with the expectation of "making real money." One of
these closed for nonfinancial reasons. The remaining 5 which sur-
vived were classified as either "potentially profitable" or "profitable."
Moreover, of the 3 firms classified as profitable, all were originally
motivated by the classic capitalistic spirit of making money. Obvi-
ously, then, motivation was a major factor in explaining success.
However, motivation for success was combined in each instance with
adequate resources, special training or previous business experience,
and a generally rational approach to business conduct. In other words,
those who opened a business in the expectation of "making real
money" generally had solid reasons for such aspirations.
A comparison of the surviving and closed firms in terms of
selected characteristics provides the following conclusions: (1) The
rate of closure varied inversely with owner's age. Viewing business
as an alternative to paid employment, the younger owners returned
to paid employment more frequently. (2) The rate of closure varied
inversely with amount of education. (3) Previous occupational experi-
ence as an employee in the particular type of business did not result in
a higher survival rate. However, previous experience as a business
owner, particularly in the same type of business, sharply increased the
chances of survival and success. (4) Within the limited size-range
covered by the sample, smaller firms were less stable than the larger
ones. Those with initial investment in excess of 7,500 dollars had
the best survival record-13 of 17 survived. Those with a capitaliza-
tion of less than 500 dollars had the poorest record-6 of 8 closed.
Within the middle range of 500 dollars to 7,500 dollars, 25 of 55
firms survived, with minimum variation of failure rates within this
range. There was little evidence to support the expectation that
those who relied more heavily on borrowed capital would have a
13. ChurehiU, supra note 6 at 18 (table 4).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
higher mortality rate. (5) Failures occurred both in growing and
declining sectors of the Providence metropolitan area, but the failure
rate was somewhat lower in the rapidly developing suburbs than in
the declining central city and satellite communities. Within each
community, the survival rate was higher in new shopping and resi-
dential areas than in the older business sections. (6) There was
no difference between the survival rate of the 35 businesses that
had been bought as operating concerns and the 46 entirely new busi-
nesses. This was due to the fact that many of the transferred busi-
nesses were declining at the time they were bought. Their buyers
were as unrealistic in evaluating their future prospects as were
several owners who established new businesses. (7) As would be
expected from the foregoing conclusions, owners' motivation and
expectations were related to their survival experience. Those who
were more rationally motivated and had planned more extensively
had a better survival rate.
V. REASONS FOR FAILURE
Examination of the case histories confirmed the expectation that a
thorough analysis cannot rely on purely statistical techniques or on
a reconstruction of the experience of either going or defunct concerns.
By their nature, both of these approaches fail to consider certain in-
tangible factors which become apparent only through direct observa-
tion of a business during the crucial stages of its early development.
Repeated contacts with going concerns made it clear that success or
failure could not be attributed to single causes, but was generally
the result of a complex interplay of various factors. However, all
factors are not equally important, and overall evaluation suggests
that some elements are more basic than others.
As the preceding comparison of the characteristics of closed and
surviving firms has shown, the fundamental factor underlying most
of the differentials was the degree of rationality involved in the
decision to open, as well as in the subsequent operation of the
enterprise. The extemporized manner in which a number of firms
were established predetermined their future. In some cases, the initial
decisions were so erroneous that the owners recognized the mistake
shortly after opening, and rapidly closed before extensive damage
ensued. A number of owners, however, were oblivious to the in-
evitability of failure and continued in operation until their resources
were exhausted.
Errors were manifested in several major areas of decision-making:
faulty location, disregard of competition, inadequate capital resources,
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overindebtedness, inept merchandising policies, careless credit poli-
cies, and organizational error. In most instances, the eventual failure
can be traced to a combination of such factors, frequently com-
pounded by deficiencies in the owner, such as a lack of technical
sophistication, personality defects, or absence of sufficient perser-
verence. Although the following discussion considers these factors in
greater detail, it should be reiterated that generally, more than one
factor was involved in every case.
A. Choice of Location
The choice of location was frequently based on such reasons as
vacancy of premises, proximity to home, familiarity with the neighbor-
hood, and availability of a business. These reasons apparently 'ap-
peared sufficient to some owners, for they did not objectively evaluate
the various locations' potential as business sites. A proper investiga-
tion would have revealed that the area was declining in population,
being bypassed by highway construction, or that it was unsuited for
the goods or services offered. In some instances, the business was
too specialized, and, in others, the same goods and services were
already adequately supplied by different firms.
B. Competition
The evaluation of existing competition should always be a major
consideration in selecting a location for a business. This elementary
principle was overlooked by a majority of the prospective owners.
Although this negligence is not necessarily fatal, it did play a major
role in several instances of failure and was a contributory factor in
other cases. Although several firms in the sample were adversely
affected during the course of their operation by subsequently estab-
lished competitors, all of them managed to deal successfully with this
competition. In the cases where competition contributed significantly
to failure, it was caused by existing competitors. The owners were
either completely unaware of this threat or blithely assumed it would
have little effect.
C. Undercapitalization
In view of the conditions prevailing in most of the firms, it was
expected that financial problems would plague many of them from
the start and play a major role in their demise. Although some
owners had contemplated owning a business and had accumulated
some savings, few of them had systematically explored the particular




As stated above in the discussion dealing with timing the opening,
most owners opened when they did simply because they perceived
an opportunity, such as a vacancy or a business for sale. Spontaneously
deciding to avail themselves of this opportunity, they proceeded with
whatever financial resources they could muster. In so doing, they
failed to realize the importance of adequate capitalization.
More specifically, the errors fell into three separate but related
categories. Some owners attempted to establish their business without
sufficient money to provide an initial stock. Others had what might
have been a sufficient initial investment but exhausted their liquid
assets at the opening, leaving no reserves to maintain the business
until a sufficient sales volume was developed. Still others relied too
heavily on borrowed capital and found that their new businesses
could not retire the obligation.
D. Credit Policies
Some owners committed these errors simultaneously, while others
combined these mistakes with inept merchandising practices and loose
credit policies. Since consumer credit is often expected of the small
neighborhood store and service station, many owners found to their
dismay that the extention of credit was necessary to attract and hold
customers. Extension of credit is obviously hazardous, particularly in
businesses with a weak capital structure, and it requires careful
control. This became a problem in a number of firms and, in some
cases, contributed to failure.
E. Personality Defects
All of the factors considered above represent errors in specific
managerial decisions. Underlying such misjudgments in many in-
stances and compounding them in others were personal deficiencies
of the owner. These deficiencies took several forms. Some owners
lacked the technical sophistication necessary either to operate a
particular type of business or any business at all. Others had the
requisite technical knowledge, but could not attract customers because
of their personality. Finally, some owners exhibited irresponsibility
and alcoholism to such an extent that the successful operation of a
business became impossible.
Obviously, these factors do not operate in isolation, and almost
every failure exhibits a combination of mistakes and errors in judg-
ment. The circumstances under which some firms were initiated
precluded success from the beginning. A few others made fatal man-
agerial errors during the course of their operation, and still others
could have continued, objectively speaking, if the owners had not
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been overwhelmed by difficulties and crises that generally beset newly
opened businesses. They lacked knowledge of what to expect and
as a result were psychologically unprepared to cope with the problems.
Frustration, impatience, and discouragement also played a role in
a number of failures and caused owners to succumb without having
adequately tested the potentialities of their businesses. Conversely,
the antithetic traits-determination, persistence and endurance-were
decisive variables for the survival of a number of firms, which, ob-
jectively, were in no better condition at the beginning than a number
of those that failed.
VI. REASONS FOR SURVIVAL
It is also possible to distinguish a number of factors which con-
tribute to the survival of business enterprises. All of these factors are
not always present in every case, but the more factors present, the
greater the chances for survival, and the better the likelihood of
success.
A. Persistence and a Low Level of Expectation
The borderline between survival and failure is to some extent
arbitrary. Several firms on the brink of failure qualified as survivors
only because they were in existence at the end of the two year limit
of the study. Basically, these enterprises differed from the failures only
in the degree of determination exhibited by their owners. Two of the
marginal firms failed within a few months after the period of observa-
tion ended. The other ten firms classified as marginal survivors
continued in existence only because their owners had other sources
of income and could be satisfied with minimal returns. Basically,
only two factors-persistence and a low level of expectation-figured
prominently in the survival of the "marginals." These two factors,
combined with others, also appeared prominently in the "limited
success" category. Persistence was also manifested by the owners of
successful businesses.
Stamina and determination to surmount difficulties are crucial
factors in business survival. New business enterprises need time to
ascertain the potential volume of business and the financial returns
obtainable. For many new firms, an initially satisfactory volume of
business, generally associated with the novelty of the outlet, is
followed by a slump in sales which may prove temporary. Such
developments may have a depressing effect on the owners and lead
them to consider dissolution. Not having been educated to anticipate
such a slump, some owners assume prematurely that their enter-
prises are failures and close.
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Owners without prior business experience are often inadequately
prepared, both financially and psychologically, to withstand pro-
tracted initial difficulties. They are overly optimistic in their original
expectations of the business' gross revenue potential and are unable
to make adjustments to the ensuing reality. Therefore, their en-
thusiasm diminishes rapidly. Individuals with previous ownership
experience anticipate the lengthy period that may be required to
firmly establish the business.
In order to understand the survival of businesses with widely vary-
ing sales volume and size of operations, it is necessary to consider the
initial expectations of the owners and the extent to which owners were
able to adjust their original expectations to reality. The original
expectations of the owners in the sample ranged from those simply
seeking supplementary income to those expecting sizable profits from
their business ventures. In most instances, the willingness to continue
in business depended on the degree to which these goals were
eventually realized. This explains the survival of most of the firms
categorized as "marginal survivors" and "limited successes." The six
owners who initially expected substantial profits from their ventures
succeeded in realizing them and qualified as either actually or poten-
tially profitable enterprises. On the other hand, some businesses
survived only because their owners were willing to adjust either
temporarily or permanently to a lower level of operations than they
had originally anticipated.
B. Acquired Ownership
The survival rate of transferred businesses was practically identical
to that of new businesses. The transferred businesses which failed
were either enterprises that had been deteriorating prior to their sale
or had been supporting the prior owners at a level lower than the
minimum needs of the new owners. In either case, the buyers failed
because their evaluations of the firms had been unrealistic. By con-
trast, the transferred firms which survived were enterprises that had
generally proved their ability to provide a standard of living adequate
to the needs of the new owners. In most cases the new owner was
previously familiar with the acquired business, and was therefore
competent to gauge the business potential realistically. All of these
firms attained their maximum potential prior to transfer, and most of
the new owners were able to maintain this level. It is therefore not
surprising to find that 10 of the surviving 17 transfers were in the
'limited success" category, although 6 were merely "marginal sur-
vivors" and 1 was a "profitable" firm.
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C. Occupational Experience
An analysis of the relationships between occupational experience
and business survival reveal several salient conclusions. (1) Work
experience as an employee in the same type of business is not posi-
tively related to survival as a business owner. (2) Previous experience
as a business owner is advantageous, particularly previous ownership
of a similar business. (3) Whether an owner gains this experience
through ownership of one or more previous firms is insignificant.
That work experience as an employee does not provide the ability
required to operate a business is proven by the fact that most of the
owners who relied exclusively on skills acquired by prior employment
failed. By contrast, those with previous work experience who sur-
vived also had managerial skills, often, but not always, acquired
through previous business ownership.
On the other hand, experience as a business owner, particularly in
the same type business, was directly related to survival and success.
Among the 33 firms in the "marginal" and the "limited success" cate-
gories, approximately half of the owners had previously been in busi-
ness for themselves. In the "potentially profitable" and "profitable"
firms, 60 per cent previously owned businesses. Moreover, the pro-
portion of prior owners with experience in the same line increased
from one-third in the "marginal" category to two-thirds in the "limited
success" category and to 100 per cent in the two "profitable"
categories.
D. Capital Investment
The average amount of initial capital invested in the surviving
firms was greater than that in the firms which failed. Although this is
significant, the wide range of investments in the surviving firms indi-
cates that the amount of capital is not the only determinant. Equally,
if not more important than the absolute figures, is the adequacy of
the capital available in relation to the type and size of operation
planned. In addition to the money invested in the venture, the ade-
quacy of the capital structure of the business also depends on whether
the owner has additional income to utilize. If necessary, he should
be able to increase the business capital or to use his nonbusiness
resources as a temporary substitute for withdrawals from the busi-
ness, until the business can support him. This is of special importance
if sizeable parts of the investment consist of short-term loans or
trade credit. In such cases, the burden of repaying indebtedness
usually permits only a minimal withdrawal for living purposes.
Generally, the adequacy of capital resources is a necessary but not a
sufficient reason for business survival. Unless a business is ade-
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quately capitalized, it cannot survive, but capital alone cannot insure
its success. Other ingredients, such as previous business experience,
managerial ability, hard work, and persistence must also be present.
E. Managerial Sophistication
Perhaps one of the most important factors in business survival and
success is managerial sophistication. Its importance to success appears
most strikingly in the failures because a definitive relationship be-
tween the absence of this trait and failure is more apparent than in
survival. This is somewhat analogous to the study of failure and
success in marriage; it is much easier to pinpoint the shortcomings
that cause a divorce than to identify favorable factors present in
successful marriages. Despite this difficulty, the case materials illumi-
nate some of the qualities which are critical in business survival and
success. As most business manuals indicate, certain managerial abili-
ties are indispensable to business success. Only one owner in the
sample utilized the guidance of a business manual. Most manuals
treat extensively managerial techniques, and discuss such aspects as
purchasing, inventory control, pricing, salesmanship, display of mer-
chandise, advertising, credit policies, record keeping, control of
overhead, and employment practices. Few businessmen acquire ex-
pertise in all these areas, but most of the survivors in the sample had
a basic knowledge of these managerial practices. In contrast, the
failures were deficient in one or more of the essential managerial
abilities.
1. Advertising.-In this era of mass communication, an essential
business practice is effective advertising. Any new business must
inform the public of its existence, and acquaint prospective customers
with the merchandise it sells or the services it offers. Most owners in
the sample advertised in some manner the opening of their businesses.
Some of those who acquired an established concern, however, as-
sumed that the existence of the business was already well known in
the neighborhood and that advertising would be a waste of money.
In several instances this was an error of judgment. These owners
failed to realize the importance of advertising the change of owner-
ship as a means of surmounting the poor reputation the business had
acquired under the previous ownership.
Although most of the owners realized that advertising their opening
was essential, many had difficulties in judging the effectiveness of their
advertising and in determining the desirability of continued advertis-
ing. The majority of the firms were too small to employ an advertising
agency and relied on trial-and-error processes that often amounted
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to a waste of money. A few businessmen in the sample did, however,
exhibit considerable skill in advertising.
Generally, advertising tends to be more of a continuous routine
business practice in large enterprises than in small ones. Eight of the
41 surviving firms drew their customers from a wide area, while the
others catered largely to the particular section of the city where they
were located. Strictly local businesses require a minimum of formal
advertising. Aside from advertising their opening and an occasional
special sale, they can rely on repeat business from regular clientele.
On the other hand, more specialized firms which depend on a larger
market must continuously present their name to the public. Since
only a fi-action of the firms in this study fell in the latter category,
advertising did not play a major role among the managerial prac-
tices that contributed to survival and success.
2. Staffing-Overhead.-Staffing was mentioned repeatedly as a
major problem by the business owners. This was particularly true in
restaurants, gas stations, and similar businesses that operate for long
hours and are run by employees, at least part-time, in the absence of
the owners. Here the ability to select high quality employees can play
a crucial role in survival and success.
The recognition of the desirability of coordinating overhead with
business volume was another manifestation of managerial ability. Rent
is frequently the most important overhead item in small businesses,
and efforts to adapt overhead to business volume usually focus on this
expense. Thus, four of the six owners who changed the location of
their enterprises did so to reduce rent. Other owners were either
planning or in the process of building their own premises on the
assumption that this would materially reduce their overhead and
increase the profitability of their enterprises.
F. Positive Personality Traits
Managerial ability is more valuable if it is supplemented by certain
personality traits. This is particularly evident under stress, because
crises test not only the owner's ability to maneuver skillfully but also
his stamina and resilience. In several cases, the survival of the busi-
ness could be credited largely to the owner's personality traits. Es-
pecially important was the willingness of several owners to expend
personal energy, not confining their efforts to supervisory operations.
The distinguishing characteristic of these owners was the determina-
tion and tenacity with which they pursued their goals of business
ownership. These owners did not view their enterprises as merely
employment, but were serious and enthusiastic about business owner-
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ship and were therefore willing to sacrifice personal comfort to survive
and succeed.
In contrast to the failures, where irresponsibility was manifested
in several cases, the survivors conducted their enterprises in a re-
sponsible and reliable manner. Customers could depend on the
businesses operating at the stated hours. In the case of one television
repair shop, operated as a part-time business, the owner installed a
telephone-answering service which recorded messages and orders from
customers. Creditors could rely on prompt repayment of loans. The
owner's sense of responsibility also was expressed in better house-
keeping practices. Although this cannot be measured statistically, the
impressions gained from comparative examination of case histories of
failures and survivors indicate that the survivors were more conscious
of the need for neat displays, clean premises, and quality service. The
result was that in most instances the survivors had good reputations
in their communities.
VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, analysis of the businesses observed in this study
reveals that certain conditions are more likely to have fatal effects on a
business venture than others. Undercapitalization, managerial in-
competence, and personality defects appear to be insurmountable
liabilities which cannot be mitigated by the presence of the other
assets. Although adequate capital and managerial competence are
indispensable for survival, they are rarely sufficient in themselves to
insure it. They must be supplemented by other factors, such as
motivation, hard work, persistence, and flexibility.
There are certain factors which are highly desirable but whose
absence is not necessarily fatal. In this category are such features
as a favorable location, accurate record keeping, good housekeeping,
and advance planning for opening and developing the business.
Unlike capital and competence, the absence of one or more of these
factors can be surmounted by hard work, managerial ability, and
positive personality traits. Like many of the failures, some of the
survivors never separated business assets from personal finances, but
this did not seriously interfere with their operations. No doubt, this
was due to the limited operations of most of the firms. As operations
expand, adequate records become an indispensable requirement.
The ideal combination of the above factors adds up to a high
degree of rationality. The greater the rationality of the owner's ap-
proach to the opening and conduct of the business, the higher is the
survival rate and the greater the degree of success. Perhaps the
major conclusion of the study was the absence of rationality exhibited
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by all but a few owners. Most owners made instantaneous decisions,
influenced by chance occurrences, and conspicuously failed to seek
expert advice. Besides the importance of rationality, the conclusions
illuminate the significant role of a personality trait, persistence. Several
firms which could have survived, closed "unnecessarily" because their
owners lacked the stamina required to endure the initial difficulties
which beset new firms. On the other hand, a number of firms survived
because of the owner's determination and endurance. If there is any
formula for business success, the ingredients consist largely of the
ability to evaluate objectively, to plan carefully, and to be prepared
emotionally to persist long enough to overcome temporary setbacks
until the business reaches its full potential.
